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FRAUDULENT INSTALLMENT SALES
IN

CHICAGO

By G. J. ALEXANDER'"
Fraudulent sales! were made long be
fore the advent of the conditional sales
contract and are now made, one can be
sure, in many varying forms. When
coupled with installment contracts, how
ever, they assume a new dimension of
viciousness, since the conditional sales
instrument enables the seller to deprive
his customers not only of present wealth,
but, also, to obtain a commitment of fu
ture earnings. Depending on the gener
osity of the legislature in providing de
vices to secure credit for the seller's
legitimate competitors, it may place un
scrupulous sellers in an alm05t impreg
nable financial position vis a vis those of
his victims who are for financial or edu
cational reasons incapable of asserting
their legal remedies, the most objection
able facit of this capability being the fact
that it depends for its success on judicial
enforcement of the contract.2
This paper will attempt to present a
brief glimpse of the magnitude of the
problem as it exists in the Chicago area
and to suggest methods of attack inde
pendent of new legislation.
For the former purpose, the author in
terviewed: Miss Agnes C. Ryan, attorney
in the Economic Division of the Chicago
Legal Aid Bureau, Mr. Carl D. Dalke,
Manager of the Automobile Division of
the Chicago Better Business Bureau and
Miss Barbara A. Davis, Assistant State's
Attorney in the Fraud and Complaints
Department.
Regrettably, none of them was able to
provide a complete picture, since all dealt
with other types of cases as well, and no
records were available which segregated
the phase herein discussed.
Miss Ryan is assigned cases concerning
collections, wage assignments and gar
nishments in the downtown,3 and larger,
offices of the Chicago Legal Aid Bureau.
A great preponderance of these cases, ac• Bigelow
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cording to her are based on conditional
sales, and almost two-thirds of them,
about 800 cases a year, by her estimate,
contain allegations of fraudulent mis
representation in conditional sales con
tracts. Surprisingly, most of the com
plaints are lodged against no more than
twenty merchants, with the more promi
nent among them having a lion's share.
Also, perhaps not so surprisingly, the la
ments tend to be quite similar. Thus,
for a while, there were a rash of cases
against a certain company charging that
used televisions, often in bad repair, were
delivered in place of new ones purchased,4
while at another time, a company was
charged with obtaining signatures on sales
contracts for freezers on the pretext of
selling food plans in which the use of the
freezer was included.5 The complainants
relating such grievances, seem to Miss
Ryan to fall within a sub group of the
generally impecunious clientele,6 repre
senting a lower income and less intelligent
group with a leaning toward recent im
migrants to the area.
At the Chicago Better Business Bu
reau, Mr. Carl D. Dalke described the or
ganization's experience with fraudulent
representations in the sale of automobiles,
which, according to him, represents a
majority of complaints based on condi
tional sale abuse considered by the Bu
reau. In 1958, 1,146 complaints were
processed by the Automobile Division, of
which 604 alleged misrepresentations in
the sale of cars as to the price, terms or
conditions of sale.7
The fraud complained of in this area
seems less imaginative than in sales of
other consumer goods, centering on prac
tices called "bushing" and "packing" by
the trade, which involve writing the con
tract to indicate payments greater than
those agreed by the parties.s Apparently
the process is facilitated by having formal
documents signed in the office of a person
called a "closer," at which signing, Mr.
Dalke states, everyone but the customer
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and "closer" are excluded. How signa
tures are obtained On contracts, incon
sistent with the verbal understandings, is
interesting but tangential to the scope
of this paper; suffice it to say, that again
there is a discernible mode of operation
which varies between individual "closers."
As was true of grievances reported to
Legal Aid, the bulk of complaints heard
by Mr. Dalke's department were lodged
against a relatively small portion of the
trade.
As might be expected, the State's At
torney's office dwarfs the other two agen
cies in the number of cases heard. In the
period January through September, 1959,
the Cook County office heard roughly
6,000 complaints in the Fraud and Com
plaints Division,9 over half of which,
Miss Davis estimates, concern instances
of fraud in connection with installment
sales. Apparently, the cases she bears are
not dissimilar from the ones related by
Miss Ryan and Mr. Dalke. She agreed
that comparatively few companies were
involved in repetitive fraudulent acts,
that the successful ruses were usually ex
ploited and that the victims tended to be
poor and uneducated.
A precise study of the abuse indicated
would undoubtedly be beneficial, but
even the fragmentary opinions reported
here seem somewhat astonishing.
It is interesting to speculate what the
incidence of fraudulent sales must be,
considering that the cases reported were
based On personal interviews o r written
complain1;s and that independent repeti
tion of the same scheme vouches for the
complainant's substantial veracity. If the
aggrieved buyers are as untutored as they
seem to the interviewers, one might sus
pect that the number registering griev
ances does not represent more than a
fraction of those who could.
Most surprising was the fact that there
was substantial agreement on the identity
of the offending companies. Despite this
information, the apparent offenders, with
few exceptions, were still prospering.
Their continued existence may be easier
to understand if the progress of com
plainants in attempting to extricate
themselves is followed.

The Better Business Bureau, while ac
tively engaged in investigation and dis
closure, does not ordinarily seek relief for
individual complainants. Unless they can
afford an attorney, these buyers are prob
ably limited to remedies made available
by the Legal Aid Bureau or the State's
Attorney's office.
At Legal Aid, according to Miss Ryan,
clients with complaints of the type con
sidered, cannot hope for substantial relief
in most cases. Usually, a contract has
been signed which does not disclose fraud
on its face; often no proof of fraud other
than their own word is available. With
limitations of time and funds, the Bu
reau policy seems to emphasize obtaining
settlements, limited in many cases to
payment of the purported debt over an
extended period of time. Only cases con
taining an element other than fraud,
which can be urged to defeat the con
tract (forgery or minority, for example)
have a bright prognosis, it apparently
being felt that allegations of fraudulent
representations are difficult to establish
in individual cases.
Lately, a master filing system for re
ported sales fraud cases has been estab
lished by Mr. Arthur K. Young, Director
of the Chicago Legal Aid Bureau, group
ing such complaints by companies. Hope
fully, sufficient information will be gen
erated to suggest warnings to offending
dealers and to indicate the desirability of
bringing suit to terminate contractual
obligations in certain cases. Should suffi
cient suits materialize, the position of the
guilty traders will deteriorate since, like
other businessmen, they cannot afford the
loss of their profits, and fraud, in its legal
sense, would certainly be a sufficient
ground for avoiding contracts,lo Fur
thermore, Legal Aid's proof problem may
have been exaggerated, for, despite the
difficulty faced by any single plaintiff
in establishing the false representation,
there may be safety in numbers, as to the
issue of the representations at least, be
cause Illinois practice would seem to al
low a number of persons similarly de
frauded to join as plaintiffs in the same
suit.ll
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At the State's Attorney's office, the
complainants f nd some succor. Accord
ing to Miss Davis, there is a strong em
phasis on settlement rather than prosecu
tion,12 despite the criminal nature of
many reported grievances.13 Victims, un
derstandably, are primarily concerned
with restitution and only secondarily
with retribution. Since criminal prosecu
tion does not necessarily accomplish the
former14 and the victim's chances for
recovery may be severely damaged by ac
quittal (thus removing the leverage of
the State's Attorney in effecting settle
ment) it is not surprising that they pri
marily press for financial adjustment and
tend to be poor witnesses in the event of
prosecution. While neither the reticence
of potential witnesses nor the desires of
victims prevent prosecution, they are fac
tors to be considered in weighing chances
of success.
Another problem in this area concerns
the ability to convict the dealer. Since
the crimes involved all require intent to
commit the act, proof against the dealer
is more difficult than it is against the
employees consummating the sales, which
tends to spare the probable prompter
whose conviction would be the most like
ly to prevent repetition.
Unfortunately, settlements avoid the
deterrent .effect of the laws and probably
explain the continued operation of the
offenders who, at most, lose their ex
pected profit and often are able to settle
with the complainant by offering a mere
reduction of the contract price. The
loss thus incurred seemingly is insufficient
motivation to alter conduct or to dis
suade others from a similar course. Prose
cution, On the other hand, despite the fact
that sentences on conviction may not be
severe,15 would probably effectuate some
reform.
The actual sentence in a criminal case
is only a segment of the total discomfort
and expense involved. Other considera
tions include the unpleasantness of ar
rest, detention with suspected criminals
and the expenses of bail and counsel. The
conviction may itself have a sobering
effect, regardless of the sentence, since ab
sent condemnation the offender could
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consider his practice merely "good busi
ness."
These considerations indicate the desir
ability of increasing prosecutions even in
face of apparent problems.16 Should such
increase fail to terminate the offending
conduct, a fortifying remedy suggests it
self in the dOC;trine of public nuisance.
Without undertaking a definition of
"public nuisance" for the moment, it
seems clear that the state has the power
to have· such nuisance abated. At com
mon-law this could sometimes be accom
plished by an order following conviction
for the misdemeanor of creating or main
taining a public nuisance, 17 a remedy
which, of course, is still available in those
states which have adopted the common
law in this respect and in those where it
has been codified. Irrespective of its
·
existence, however, there was and is a
remedy in equity to enjoin continuation
of nuisances.IS
To the extent that the equitable rem
edy is applicable to acts which also con
stitute crimes, other than the crime of
public nuisance, there has been unfavor
able comment.19 Since equity has no
jurisdiction to restrain crimes, as such,20
writers urge circumspection in extending
chancery remedies in this area. Of pri
mary concern is the lack of traditional
criminal safeguards, of which denial of
jury trial, the presumption of innocence
and burden of proof beyond reasonable
doubt are the most discussed. Actually,
the denial runs to all of the protections
that distinguish our criminal procedure
from civil procedure. Furthermore once
an injunction issues, continuation of the
act can be dealt with summarily as con
tempt of court while otherwise it would
be merely the basis of another prosecution,
and it is urged that, since equity's juris
diction is premised on the inadequacy of
the legal remedy, it should not in any
event hear cases which could be dis
posed of by criminal trial.21 Despite these
objections, courts of equity have found
the power to abate such nuisances.22 To
the objections concerning criminal safe
guards, the courts have answered that
they are not concerned with the crimes,
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as such, but are merely suppressing the
nuisance or punishing contempt of their
orders.23 Faced with the objection of the
adequacy of prosecution, they have found
the remedy to be impracticable due to
surrounding circumstances or insufficient
protection for the public.24
It would, perhaps, be less difficult to
overlook the entire controversy if one
could delimit "public nuisances." Rely
ing on ancient precedent, one could then
relegate "nuisance" cases to chancery
with a clear conscience despite litigation
concerning criminal issues. On examina
tion, however, circumscription becomes
impossible. The term "public nuisance"
appears to be so broad that it merely ex
presses the conclusion of the court's will
ingness to hear a given case or class of
cases.25 Some courts have gone to the
extreme of classifying all continuous
criminal acts as "public nuisances"26
while other decisions are sufficiently er
ratic to make it impossible to predict
which acts will be considered within the
class,27 nor will reference to the defini
tion prove very helpful. Blackstone de
fines common (public) nuisance as, "a
species of offenses against the public order
and the economical regimen of the state;
being either the doing of a thing against
the public order and the economical regi
men of all the king's subjects, or the
neglecting to do a thing which the com
mon good requires."28
Despite criticism,29 using the label
"public nuisance", courts of equity have
invoked the injunctive remedy in those
areas where sufficient danger to public
interests was apprehended.30 One area
analogous to fraudulent conditional sales
has already been the subject of such judi
cial scrutiny.
At least ten states have considered
whether a continuous usurious loan busi
ness constitutes a "public nuisance" abata
ble in equity (not including those states
where injunction is specifically prescribed
by statute). Of these, six have held it
does,31 four have held otherwise.32 The
cases are, of course, not parallel. Usury,
where proscribed, is the subject of a spe
cific statute making the legislative intent

clear, despite failure to provide equitable
remedies. Fraudulent acts, to the extent
that they are illegal, are so due to general
criminal provisions, which provide no
indication whether the legislature finds
such acts more offensive in a continuous
business setting than in a back alley
transfer. Such an argument, however,
presupposes a lesser exertion of independ
ent judgment on the part of equity courts
than the cases indicate. In the final an
alysis, the courts, not the legislatures,
decided usury was a menace to the
"public welfare", sufficiently grave to
call forth an injunction; the legislatures
merely enacted proscriptions. No reason
suggests itself why chancery should be
more inhibited respecting a phase of
generally prohibited conduct.
A court might alternatively find that
usury has a greater impact on "public
welfare" than fraudulent conditional
sales. A vivid picture of destitution sug
gests itself when the victims of "loan
sharks" are considered. Persons able to
purchase appliances or an automobile on
installment credit seem less in need of
protection. Such distinctions have been
voiced in connection with application of
usury laws to conditional sales,33 but may
be questionable today because of the
growth of the installment market in
recent years. In 1925 there were approxi
mately two and a half billion dollars in
outstanding installment paper.34 By Sep
tember of 1958, the Federal Reserve re
ported the volume at over 33 billion.35
The class of persons protected by usury
laws, passed many years ago, may now
swell the ranks of installment buyers. In
1956, twenty percent of all "spending
units" in the United States with incomes
under $1,000 were installment debtors, as
were thirty four percent of those with
incomes under $2,000 and forty five per
cent of those with incomes under
$3,000.36 The median amount owed by
indebted "spending units" with incomes
between $2,000 and $3,000 was $250,37
and a large proportion of such units, espe
cially those with incomes under $3,000,
had no other liquid assets than currency
on which to draw.3s
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Even if the problem of usury is equated
with current fraudulent practices in in
stallment sales, and if there is agreement
that both sufficiently harm the "public
welfare" to earn the title "public nui
sance", little authority exists to support
the adoption of the injunctive remedy in
fraud cases. In three of the six states
where such relief was granted against
usury, usury was not a criminal offense.39
In three of four states where the remedy
was denied, it was a crime, and this fac
tor may have infuenced the court, despite
disclaimer of such influence in the de
cisions, which focused instead on de
termining whether the acts were "nui
sances."40 Furthermore, extension of the
equitable remedy into the criminal area
is, probably, by the better view, undesir
able.41
Adverse comment about expanding
equitable intervention into frontier "pub
lic nuisance" cases does not, however,
apply to the other common law remedy
against such nuisance: abatement follow
ing criminal conviction.42 Current ardor
for the swifter proceedings in chancery
has greatly eclipsed utilization of the
criminal remedy, despite the fact that
prosecution was apparently the usual
method at common law,43 that the crime
was adopted in this country along with
its remedial abatement order,44 as part of
the common-law, and is still in effect in
some states.45
There would appear little reason why
criminal "public nuisance" should be
more restricted than the equitable count
erpart. Both are based on the same broad
definition, essentially considering the ad
verse effect on "public welfare."46 In
usury cases, an indictment charging pub
lic nuisance has been found proper in at
least one state.47
If courts were to apply the criminal
"public nuisance" doctrine to businesses
which repetitively use fraud as a sales
device, criminal safeguards, deemed vital
to many writers considering the nuisance
area, would be preserved in litigation de
termining the underlying illegal conduct.
Being predicated on conviction, the rem
edy would be slower than injunction in
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application. For the same reason, however,
courts might find criminal abatement less
offensive and be readier to apply it. Fur
thermore, as the "keeper" of property on
which a nuisance is committed is indicta
ble therefor, the owner of an offending
business, presumptively the principal of
fender, could be prosecuted without proof
of actual intent to defraud or fraudulent
acts on his part.48
Following conviction, an abatement
order can be expected to make continua
tion of the "nuisance" perilous. Of
course, not all methods of abating nui
sances would be applicable to fraudulent
sales cases. For example, committing the
defendant until the nuisance is removed,
while permissible at common-law,49 may
be more effective to remove an obstruc
tion of a public highway than to cause
termination of fraudulent conduct.50 It
seems better in sales fraud cases to order
the defendant to abate the nuisance, and
if he persists in his illegal operations after
the order, command the sheriff to ac
complish the abatement.51 Having given
the defendant opportunity to reform, it
would not seem too harsh to order the
premises padlocked. Another alternative
is to order the defendant to abate and
treat non compliance as contempt of
court.52
Illinois appears to be one of the states
in which common-law criminal nuisance
is recognized. While a specific statute
deals with public nuisances53 it has been
held that the conduct therein proscribed,
not including any act applicable to the
instant problem, is merely declaratory of
the common Iaw54 and does not exclude
unenumerated common-law nuisance�.55
Unsettled as yet is the question whether
the statutory remedy, providing for abate
ment by the sheriff at the defendant's ex
pense,56 has superseded the common law
remedy. In People v. Livingston,57 the
Illinois Appellate Court reversed a County
Court's order that the defendant abate
the nuisance of which he had been con
victed. The opinion held the lower court's
jurisdiction limited and, therefore, bound
to the statutory prescription of abate
ment by the sheriff.58 No indication is
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given how the appeal would have been
decided had a criminal court of general
jurisdiction rendered judgment, except
that stress placed on jurisdictional limita
tions would seem to be premised on a
recognition of the existence of common
law remedies.
If Illinois courts are limited to the
statutory remedy, it would seem that they
might still order the sheriff to padlock
the premises of offenders with previous
similar convictions.
Another group, aside from the de
frauded buyers, would seem to suffer
rather directly from the offending con
duct: the legitimate competition. Not
depending on deception for their profit,
they may be unable to match the "offers"
made by fraudulent sellers, while sharing
the resultant bad publicity. Less directly,
perhaps, these dealers are harmed by legis
lative action designed to curb the abuses
which may also result in limiting the
scope of their operations or their remedies.
By applying "public nuisance" doc
trines some courts have enjoined illegal
conduct in suits by such competitors. De
spite the fact that "public nuisances" are
primarily the concern of the state, an
exception has long been made for per
sons who suffer substantial injury distinct
from that suffered by the public.59 Com
petitors have sometimes been found to fall
within that exception.60
From the standpoint of the defendant,
an equitable action presents the same
problems whether initiated by an indi
vidual or the state. Perhaps in suits by
competitors, chancery is more justified in
its intervention. The criminal remedy,
which might seem a reasonable ground for
denying the state an injunction, is not in
any true sense available to the private
plaintiff. Normally, prosecutions are con
ducted by the government, which has a
considerable amount of discretion in the
timing of cases and choice of defend
ants.61 Furthermore, if the plaintiff has
suffered damage by the illegal act of his
competitor, there is an independent
ground for invoking civil jurisdiction,
not present in suits by the state.62 It
would seem that, denied an injunction,

the legitimate dealer is helpless against
illegal acts by a competitor, since they
are not a legally recognized tort. Absence
of alternative remedies is itself a strong
argument for equitable intervention.63
One would suspect that the hardest
part of the plaintiff's case would be proof
of damages. Except in rare cases,64 diffi
culties arise in showing deprivation of
trade by the defendant's actions. While
customers, absent the illegality charged,
might not have dealt with the culprit,
they might well have gone to another il
legal operator, thus equally depriving
the plaintiff. Alternatively, they might
have dealt with a legitimate competitor
or have abstained from buying entirely.
Arguably, they might have dealt with
the offender on a legitimate basis.
In practice, however, courts may not
require a rigorously logical demonstra
tion,65 though some have been meticu
lous.66
Tied to the same problem is the ques
tion whether injury to trade is a recog
nized "damage" at law. Many courts
analyze the damage requirement in terms
of the plaintiff's "property right"
> in his
business operation and consider interfer
ence therewith "property damage." Ac
cordingly, courts have granted injunc
tions against unlicensed professional prac
titioners, relying on the "property right"
or "franchise" inherent in the license,
while others have refused such relief find
ing no "property right."67 Courts have
also enjoined unlicensed competitive trans
portation services finding "property" in
the franchise,68 but have refused to en
join a barber's competitor who cut hair
on Sunday in violation of a Sunday Clos
ing law,69 and architects' unlicensed com
petitors,70 since the plaintiffs, in these
cases, did not have "property rights" to
protect. A number of courts, however,
find a broader "property right" in the
conduct of a lawful business, thereby en
abling the proprietor to enjoin illegally
operating competitors.71
The term "property right", as used in
cases of business competition, would seem
to express a conclusion, of which perhaps
the clearest demonstration exists in the
case of trademarks. Some courts call
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trademarks "property rights" in invok
ing injunctions a g a i n s t competitive
abuses,72 yet the primary "property" in
the right would seem to be the ability to
enjoin others from their use.73 In other
cases of commercial competition, the
property concept is equally elusive. Cer
tainly, a businessman has a "property
right" in his lawful business, in the sense
that it cannot be expropriated, in most
cases, without compensation; but this is
not the question. The question is whether
there is a sufficient "property" interest
for a court to protect against illegal com
petition.

only be less suspect of harassment but
better able to compile and present salient
facts concerning the damage caused by
the offending conduct. Regrettably, since
associations are heirs to their members'
faults, the only guaranteed virtue in hav
ing them appear as parties is the reduc
tion in the number of potential plaintiffs.
Coupling the problems inherent in setting
such a group in motion with the difficulty
of proving the defendant's continuous
illegal conduct, however, may be a suf
ficient deterrent to abuse in light of the
discretionary nature of the injunctive
remedy.

In the professional license cases, as an
other example, many courts have struggled
over the question whether the licensing
statutes were designed to protect the pro
fession or the public in determining the
sufficiency of the "property interest" in
volved.74 Even assuming that the legis
lature was protecting members of the
profession, however, it does not follow
that they included a "property right"
secured by equitable remedies, since had
they considered this one of the privileges
of the license, their intent could well have
been articulated in the statute. Undeni
ably, licenses become "property rights" as
soon as equity enjoins unlicensed practice,
but such reasoning is circular.

The Illinois position on injunctions
against "illegally" operating competitors is
unsettled, having been given only cursory
attention when considered. In Excelsior
Steel Furnace Co. v. F. Meyer f§ Brothers
Co., 76 the court was asked to end a pat
ent infringement and to enjoin the de
fendant from stamping certain competi
tive items as patented, contrary to fact.
The court said: "In so far as appellee is
manufacturing articles like those that ap
pellant manufactures and has falsely
stamped upon them that they are pat
ented, we are of the opinion that equity
will not interfere in the way and manner
indicated in this bill. We do not believe
equity has jurisdiction at the suit of one
trader in an article to enjoin another
trader in a similar article from telling
falsehoods about his own article. It is
not charged as to these articles that ap
pellee is telling any falsehoods about ap
pellant's articles, but merely that he is
telling falsehoods about the articles which
appellee manufactures.76 That was the
entirety of the opinion on point.

The rule that any person engaged in
lawful business has sufficient standing to
enjoin competitors from continuing il
legal acts, having a reasonable relation
ship to loss of his customers, has much to
commend it, probably providing the only
remedy for this class of victims and bol
stering standards of the trade by giving
dealers a palatable alternative to joining
in marginal practices to keep their share
of profit. Since the competitive commer
cial setting provides more than average
temptation to abuse remedies, one might
expect competitors to eagerly denounce
each other as "fraudulent" dealers, or
threaten such action unless their com
plaint is "settled." Perhaps, for this rea
son, it would be more desirable to have
suits initiated by associations of the class
of dealers affected by the illegal acts.
Organizations of this type would not

In Edelman Bros. v. Charles Baikoif,77
the court considered the propriety of an
injunction against certain persons who
allegedly violated Chicago municipal ordi
nances prohibiting solicitation of trade
on public sidewalks as an unlawful nui
sance, subject to fine, and forbidding re
lated acts. The suit was brought by per
sons claiming to represent "most of the
merchants" in said neighborhood78 alleg
ing that the defendants were molesting
prospective customers. Essentially, the
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complaint stated that the defendants were
continuously engaged in hawking wares
and doing other acts on the sidewalk in
front of their own stores to induce pass
ers by to enter, hurting the plaintiff's
trade both in that customers were inc
duced to deal with the violators, and in
that they avoided the neighborhood be
cause of the annoyance.
The court affirmed the denial of a de
murrer, finding the acts a nuisance and
a "property right" in the continuation of
lawful business. Unexcused acts which
interfered with lawful business were held
sufficient damage to sustain the injunc
tion and "special damage" was found in
the loss of trade. Finally, the court spe
cifically rejected the argument that the
available criminal remedy prevented equi
table intervention. In short, said the
court, the "gist of [the allegations] is
that the defendant's daily and continuous
acts . . . are especially injurious to com
plainants in their trade and business and
in the established good will of their cus
tomers; i.e. in their property rights."79
This was sufficient, the court held, to en
join the nuisances.
Illinois has sustained the right of a
single attorney to enjoin the unlicensed
practice of law.80 An injunction has also
been upheld against the unlicensed prac
tice of three chiropractors by five of their
licensed competitors.81
Finally, Jones v. Smith Oil and Refin
ing Co. 82 should be noted. In that case,
the plaintiff was a retail oil service station
operator, whose complaint alleged that
his competitor was using an illegal lottery
to attract customers. The court, in an
opinion affirming the injunction, mainly
considered the lottery question, and, after
finding the acts constituted lottery, gave
short shrift to the remaining problems:
"It is argued strenuously by the appellant
that the courts have no jurisdiction to

LECTURE

grant an injunction to restrain a person
from committing a crime, and this is, in
effect, what the granting of an injunc
tion is doing in this case. The injunction
in this case was not issued on the theory
that it was to restrain the appellant from
committing a crime, but on the theory
that the contemplated plan was a viola
tion of law and the same would be unfair
competition of trade against the appellee,
and if permitted to continue would seri
ously interfere with the business of the
appellee, and for this reason the injunc
tion was issued. Under such conditions it
is our opinion that the injunction was
properly issued."83
The Illinois cases seem to indicate a
recognition of the right to protect one's
business from continuous illegal competi
tive acts. The earlier pronouncements of
the Excelsior Steel case appear contrary
but there is no indication that the court
had been asked to consider the issue of
illegality in the sale of misbranded goods
and, without that element, they may have
correctly found that no action lay. Read
broadly, the assertions cannot be recon
ciled with later cases.
With the ever increasing impact of
conditional sales on our economy and
with legislative concern focused on the
problems involved,84 now is a good time
to attempt to eliminate the unscrupulous
element from the group. Whether the
best road to this end lies in massing civil
actions, as Legal Aid might, or bringing
prosecutions, cannot be forecast. At any
rate, prosecutions can be expected to
prove more effective, without sacrifice of
criminal jurisprudential concepts, by the
rejuvenation of abatement orders on con
viction. Possibly, competitors are in the
best position to proceed. It is not neces
sary to decide the question of priority; a
combination of the remedies will certainly
do the job.
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FOOTNOTES
1.
"Fraudulent sales," as used in this paper,
is intended to be a loose description of a class
of wilful, deceptive acts on the part of the
seller designed to result, and resulting, in a
"contract." It is meant to correspond with the
layman's concept "being defrauded."
2. This is especially evident in states which
enforce confession of judgment clauses, as does
Illinois. Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 110 §50 (4) (1956).
Such clauses enable the seller to obtain a judg
ment in essentially em parte proceedings, a
remedy frequently utilized by at least some
unscrupulous dealers. Of a list of ten com
panies named by a Chicago Legal Aid Bureau
representative as being those against whom the
most allegations of fraudulent sales were made,
A had filed 1,107 suits in the Chicago Munici
pal Court in 1958; B, 1,085; three others over
250 each. A spot check of these complaints
failed to disclose any cases other than confes
sions of judgment in this group.
3. 123 W. Madison Street, Chicago, Ill.
4. Orders were taken from catalogs. The
installment contracts uniformly had the word
"recond,"
inserted
inconspicuously
in
the
description of the set sold.
5. Almost any issue of The Report (a pub
lication by the Chicago Better Business Bureau)
reveals other schemes. Sometimes they are
relatively elaborate. In order to sell furnaces,
for example, one company alleged. l:y h�d em
ployees pose as government or utlllty lllspec
tors, who on being admitted to homes to "check
the furnace " would warn the homeowner of
mortal dan er if the unit was not replaced.
Alternatively salesmen would offer to check
furnaces,inv riably finding "small " leaks which
they would offer to fix. The furnace would
then be promptly dismantled, whereupon the
salesman would find it hopelessly defective and
incapable of reassembly without risking the life
of the family and neighbors. In at least one
case ' a public utility representative, called by
the homeowner to verify the diagnosis, was
unable to f nd any defect. Chicago Better Busi
ness Bureau, The Report, March 10, 1958, p. 4.
6. The Chicago Legal Aid �ureau limits its
assistance to persons whose Incomes are less
than maximal amounts, determined by the
application of a r,,:ther complex forlI!ula t.o
economic data obtallled from prospective cll
ents.
7.
Letter from Mr. Carl D. Dalke to the
author, August 10, 1959, on f le.
8. "Bushing" is def ned, by Mr. Dalke, as
the practice of indicatin.g a sales price, i,! a
written contract, exceedIng the agreed prIce.
"Packing" accomplishes a price increase by
adding insurance or service charges, in excess
of those agreed, to the cash sales price. These
practices often account for substantial differ
ences. For example, a certain car lot adver
tised a car at $445,but indicated the price on
the purchase order as $495. The "cash price"
entry on the bill of sale for the same car was
$655. Chicago Better Business Bureau, The
Report, Jan. 27, 1958, p. 7.
9. This figure is based on the complaint
number in use at the end of the period, com
plaints being consecutively numbered.
10. 1 Corbin, Contracts 11, 12 (1950).
11. Weigend v. Hulsh, 315 Ill. App. 116, 42
N. E. 2d 146 (1942). But see Gombi v. Taylor
Washing Machine Co., 290 Ill. App. 53, 7
N. E. 2d 929 (1937). See a discussion of these
two cases in Opal v. Material Service Co., 9 Ill.
App. 2d 433, 133 N. E. 2d 733 (1956); and
see Parties and Joinder oj Actions Under the
Illinois Civil Practice Act, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 41
(1948).
12. Miss Davis remembered only three prose
cutions, within the last two years, in which
dealers were charged with multiple violations
of the penal code. A small number of single
complaints were also prosecuted in the same
period.

g

a

13. See Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §253 (1953)
(false pretenses); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §256
(confidence game); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §140
(1953) (conspiracy); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §277
(1953) (forgery); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §249a
(1953) (untrue, misleading, deceptive advertis
ing).
14. The false pretenses statute specifically
provides for restitution as part of the sentence.
Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §253 (1953). None of the
other statutes listed in note 11 has similar
provisions.
15.
In the three prosecutions charging mul
tiple violations, mentioned
by Miss Davis,
supra, note 12, one resulted in the conviction
of two of three defendants, the convicted per
sons being fined $200 each. Chicago Better
Business Bureau, 'I'he Report, August 25, 1958,
p. 1. The other two, according to Assistant
State's Attorney Davis, resulted in a similarly
light sentence in one, and acquittal in the
other.
16. Miss Davis stated, in a conversation
subsequent to the initial interview, that her
office was in the process of accelerating prose
cutions.
17.
9 Ha!sbury's Laws oj England 231 (2d
ed. 1933); 2 Wood, Nuisances 1305 (3rd ed.
1893).
18. 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 953955 (5th ed. 1941).
19.
Caldwell, Injunctions Against Crime, 26
Ill. L. Rev. 259 (1931); Dunbar, Government
by Injunction, 13 Law Q. Rev. 347 (1897);
Gregory, Government by Injunction, 11 Harv.
L. Rev. 487 (1898); Mack, The Revival oj
Criminal Equity, 16 Harv. L. Rev. 389 (1903);
Ralston, Government by Injunction, 5 Cornell
L. Rev. 424 (1920); Schofield, Equity Juris
diction to Abate and EnjOin Illegal Saloons as
a fUb!iy Nuisanc�, 8 Ill. L. Rev. 19 (1913);
Injunct.on oj Crtmes Without Statutory Au
thority, 23 Albany L. Rev. 361 (1959).
20. 4 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra, note 18, at
951.
21. See id. at 949, 950, 950 n. 4.
22. Re: Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895) ; State
v. Hines, 178 Kan. 142,283 P. 2d 472 (1955);
Bennington v. Hawks, 100 Vt. 37, 134 AU. 638
; 4 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra, note 18, at

��i�6)

23. A good articulation of this idea is found
in Re: Debs, supra, note 22, where Mr. Justice
Brewster stated: "The law is full of instances
in which the same act may give rise to a civil
and a criminal prosecution. An assault with
!nt�nt to kill may be punish�d criminally,under
llldlctment therefor, or WIll support a civil
action for damages, and the same is true of
all other offenses which cause injury to person
or property. . • . So here, the acts of the
defendants may or may not have been viola
tions of the criminal law. If they were that
matter .is for inquiry in other proceedings The
complamt made against them in this is dis
obedience to an order of a civil court made
for the protection of property and the s curity
of rights. " I d. at 594.
24. Stead v. Fortner, 255 Ill. 468, 99 N. E.
680 (1912); State em rel. Burgum v. Hooker,
. . .. N. D. ....,87 N. W. 2d 337 (1957).
25. See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private
A ption, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1914), especially
hIS oft quoted phrase, "Nuisance is a good
word to beg a question with." Id. at 326.
26. State v. Rabinowitz, 85 Kan. 841, 118
P. 1040 (1911); [(night v. Foster, 163 N. C.
329, 79 S. E. 614 (1913).
.27. State v. Barry, 217 S. W. 957 (Tex.
elV. App. 1919) (showing motion picture on
Sunday in violation of Sunday closing law not
a nuis �nce) ; Hamlin v. Bender, 173 App. Div.
996, 1,,9 N. Y. S. 1117 (1916) (same thing a
nuisance); People em rei. Shepardson v. Uni
versal Chiropractor's Ass'n, 302 Ill. 228, 134
N. E. 4 (1922) (practice of unlicensed chiro-

:
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practors not a nuisance); Burden v. Hoover,
Ill. 2d 114, l37 N. E. 2d 59 (1956) (over
ruling Shepardson v. Universal Chiropractor's
AS8'n, 8upra, without specifically labeling the
offense a nuisance). Notes 30 and 31, infra,
and accompanying text, indicate the disagree
ment between states ori whether a business
dealing in usurious loans is a nuisance.
28. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law
of England 166 (7th ed. 1775).
29. "The distortion of the injunction into a
weapon of the criminal law can be of no ulti
mate salutory effect." Note, 43 Harv. L. Rev.
499, 499, 450 (1930); see note 19, supra, and
accompanying text.
30. In his article on this subject, Professor
CaldwQIl after analyzing cases states, "The
foregoing cases indicate that courts of equity
are tending more and more toward a complete
recognition of their power to protect the health
and morals of the public as well as its prop
erty and to prevent threatened interference
with the security and general welfare of the
community as well as interference with its
tangible substances." Caldwell, op. cit. supra,
note 19, at 266, 267.
Larson v. State, 266 Ala. 589, 97 So. 2d
31.
776 (1957); State eil) reI. Moore v. Gillian,
141 Fla. 707, 193 So. 751 (1940); State eil) reI.
Beck v. Basham, 146 Kans. 181, 70 P. 2d 24
(1937); Commonwealth eil) reI. Grauman v.
Continental, 275 Ky. 238, 121 S. W. 2d 49
(1938); State eil) reI. Goff v. O'Neil, 205 Minn.
366, 286 N. W. 316 (1939); State eil) reI.
Burgum v. Hooker, .. . . N. D. . ..., 87 N. W.
2d 337 (1957). In Missouri a lower court con
curred. The issue was specifically excluded
from consideration in the opinion of the su
preme court, reversing on other ground's, Kansas
City v. Markham, 339 Mo. 753, 99 S. W. 2d 28
(1936).
Stephens v. Seccombe, 103 Cal. App.
32'
306, 284 Pac. 725 (1930); State eil) reI. Boykin
v. Ball Investment Co., 191 Ga. 382, 12 S. E.
2d 574 (1940); Commonwealth v. Stratton
Finance, 310 Mass. 469, 38 N. E. 2d 640
(1941); Eil) parte Hughes, 133 Tex. 505, 129
S. W. 2d 270 (1939).
33. E.g., General Motors Acaeptanae Corp.
v. Weinrich, 218 Mo . App. 68, 262 S. W. 425
(1924).
Seligman, The Economics of Installment
34.
Buying 18 (1927).
35. 44 Federal Reserve Bull. 1324 (1958).
36. u. S. Board of Governors of the Fed
eral Reserve: Oonsumer Installment Oredit,
Part 1 Vol. I, at 87 (1957). " Spending unit "
is defined as "all related persons living to
gether who pool their income. " Ibid.
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37. Ibid.
38. Id. at 92.
39. Alabama, Kansas, Minnesota. Larson v.
State, 266 Ala. 589, 97 So. 2d 776 (1957);
State eil) reI. Beck v. Basham, 146 Kans. 181,
70 Pac. 2d 24 (1937); State eil) reI. Goff v.
O'Neill, 205 Minn. 1l66, 286 N. W. 316 (1939).
40. Stephens v. Seccombe, 103 Cal. App.
306, 284 Pac. 725 (1930); State eil) reI. Boykin
v. Ball Investment Co., 191 Ga. 382, 12 S. E.
2d 574 (1940); Oommonwealth v. Stratton Fi
nance, 310 Mass. 469, 38 N. E. 2d 640 (1941).
41. See note 19 supra, and accompanying
text.
42. See note 17 supra.

43. Board of Health v. Du Pont de Nemours
Powder Co., 79 N. J. E. 31, 80 Atl. 998 (1911).
Blackstone writes discussing private wrongs,
"Let us next attend to the remedies which the
law has given for this injury of nuisance . . •
no action lies for common or public nuisance,
but indictment only . . . " 3 Blackstone, op. cit.
supra note 25, 219. He was contrasting public
and private remedies and his remarks should,
therefore, not be taken literally, their signifi
cance consisting in the fact that indictment
was chosen for contrast. The equitable remedy
would have to be substituted in a moderniza
tion of the statement.

44. Ehrliah v. Oommonwealth, 125 Ky. 742,
102 S. W. 289 (1907); Bollinger v. Common
wealth, 98 Ky. 574, 35 S. W. 553 (1896);
People v. High Ground Dairy Co., 166 App.
Div. 81, 151 N. Y. S. 710 (1915); State v.
Prudential Coal Co., 130 Tenn. 275, 170 S. W.
57 (1914).
45. Miller, Criminal Law 416 (1934).
46. "It may be said that an indictment for
a nuisance lies in all cases where the i:njury is
general, and affects public rights . . ." 2 Wood,
op. cit. supra note 17, a t 1298, 1299. For ex
amples of the wide range of acts which have
been prosecuted see id. at 1299 1302.
47.
State v. Diamant, 73 N. J. L. 131, 62
Atl. 268 (1905). But see Commonwealth v.
Mutual Loan and Trust Co., 156 Ky. 299, 160
S. W. 1041 (1913); Commonwealth v. Hill, 46
Pa. Super. 505 (1911), in which such indict
ment was held improper because usury was
not a crime.
48. Wood states, "If any servant in the
course of his employment, but without my
knowledge, and even contrary to my orders,
creates a public nuisance . . . I am liable
therefor civilly and criminally, even though
. . . I could in no sense be said to have done
the act." 1 Wood, op. ait. supra note 17, at 52.
49.
2 Wood, op. aU. supra note 17, at 1305.
50. Also, at least one court has found it an
improper method. Bollinger v. Oommonwealth,
98 Ky. 574, 35 S. W. 553 (1896).
51.
People v. High Ground Dairy, 166 App.
Div. 81, 151 N. F. S. 710 (1915); State v.
Prudential Coal 00., 130 Tenn. 275, 170 S. W.
57 (1914).
52. Ehrliah v. Oommonwealth, 125 Ky. 742,
102 S. W. 289 (1907).
53. Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 § §466 466b (Supp.
1959).
54.
Town of Manteno v. Suprenant, 210 Ill.
App. 438 (1917).
55. People eil) reI. Dyer v. Clark, 268 Ill.
156,108 N. E. 994 (1915).
56. Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38 §467 (Supp. 1959).
57. 331 Ill. App. 313, 73 N. E. 2d 136
(1947).
58.
"The county court is a court of limited
jurisdiction and is given certain jurisdiction by
the constitution, but all other jurisdiction must
be conferred by statute, and if conferred by
statute the jurisdiction is limited to such cases
as are specified in the statute. "
People v.
Livingston, supra at 319, 73 N. E. 2d at 139.
59.
3 Blackstone, op. cit. supra note 25, at
220.
60. Long v. Southern Eil)press, 201 Fed. 441
(S. D. Fla. 1912), rev'd on other grounds, 202
Fed. 462 (5th Cir. 1913); Edelman Bros. v.
Baikoff, 277 Ill. App. 432 (1934).
Miller, op. ait. supra note 43, at 3.
61.
62. Pomeroy states, "The incompleteness
and inadequacy of the legal remedy is the cri
terion which, under settled doctrine,determines
the right to the equitable remedy of injunc
tion." 4 Pomeroy, op. aU. supra note 18, at
936.
63.
Illegal competitive acts have been held
a sufficient ground for equitable intervention,
by a number of courts, even without finding
them a "public nuisance. " Jones v. Smith Oil
and Refning 00., 295 Ill. App. 519, 15 N. E.
2d 42 (1938); Glover v. Maloska, 238 Mich.
216, 213 N. W. 107 (1927) ; Alper v. Las Vegas
Motel Ass'n, . . . . Nev. . .. . , 325 P. 2d 767
(1958) ; Ohoctaw Pressed Briak 00. v. Town
send, 108 Okla. 235, 236 Pac. 46 (1925);
fi'eatherstone v. Independent Service Stations
Ass'n, 10 S . W. 2d 124 (Dallas Civ. App.
1928).
64. E.g., where the plaintiff is the only
legitimate source of an item.
65.
In Alper v. Las Vegas Motel Ass'n,
. . . . Nev. ...., 325 P. 2d 767 (1958), the
proof apparently consisted of motel owners'
repetition of statements made to them by
motorists who said they would patronize com
petitors illegally advertising the cost of lodg
ing. In Glover v. Maloska, 238 Mich. 216, 213
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N. W. 107 (1927), the damages consisted of a
decrease in the plaintiff's sales and an increase
in the defendant's sales. In Featherstone v.
Independent Service Stations Ass'n, 10 S. W.
2d 124 (Dallas Civ. App. 1928), the court
found the damages in "that various prospec
tive customers of plaintiff left his place with
out making purchases, on discovering that he
did not distribute tickets for the automobile
drawing [an alleged lottery] and that, since
and during the operation of the schemes plain
tiff's business declined, he lost money, whilst
the defendant's business increased and they
made money as the result of the scheme." Id.
at 125.
66.
Goldsmith v. Jewish Press Pub. 00.,
118 Misc. Rep. 789, 195 N. Y. S. 37 (1922);
MacBeth v. Gerbers Ino., 72 R. I. 102, 48 A.
2d 366 (1946).
67.
Oompetitor's Right to Enjoin Unlicensed
Professional Practice, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 714,
718 (1957).
68.
Wichita Transportation 00. v. People's
Taxicab 00., 140 Kans. 40, 34 P. 2d 550
(1934); New York, N. H. <£ H. Ry. 00. v.
Deister, 253 Mass. 178, 148 N. E. 590 (1925);
Union Traction 00. v. Smith, 115 Misc. Rep.
73, 187 N. Y. S. 377 (1921) ; Long's Bagga ge
Transfer 00. v. Burford,144 Va. 339, 132 S. E.
355 (1926).

69. York v. Ysaguairre, 31 Tex. Civ. App.
26,71 S. W. 536 (1902).
70.
Arkansas State Board of Architects v.
Olark,226 Ark. 548, 291 S. W. 2d 262 (1956).
71.
Long v. Southern Express, 201 Fed. 441
(S. D. Fla. 1912), ,·ev'd on other grounds, 202
Fed. 462 (5 th Cir. 1913) ; Oalifornia Gasoline
Retailers v. Regal Petroleum Oorporation of

Fresno, . . . . Cal. 2d . .. . , 322 P. 2d 945
(1958); Edelman Bros. v. Baikofj, 277 Ill.
App. 432 (1934) ; Glover v. Maloska, 238 Mich.
216, 213 N. W. 107 (1927); Alper v. Las
Vegas Motel' Ass'n, .. . . Nev. . . . . , 325 P. 2d
767 (1958); Ohoctaw Pressed Brick 00. v.
Townsend, 108 Okla. 235, 236 Pac. 46 (1925);
Featherstone v. Independent Service Stations
Ass'n, 10 S. W. 2d 124 (Dallas Civ. App.
1928).
72.
E.g. Oircle Oab v. SpringjieldJ Yellow
Cab, 73 Ohio Law Abstract 193, 137 N. E. 2d
137 (1954).
73.
4 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 18, at
962, 962 n. 20. Pomeroy states that, "the
remedy does not depend upon any true property

acquired . . . but upon the broad principle
that a court of equity will not permit fraud
to be practiced upon the public nor upon
individuals." Ibid.
74.

Op. cit. supra note 66, at 719.

75.

182 Ill. App. 537 (1913).

76.

Id. at 539.

77.

277 Ill. App. 432 (1934).

78.

Id. at 440.

79.

Id. at 448.

80.
Smith v. Illinois Adjustment Finance
00., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 N. E. 2d 264 (1945).
81.
Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill. 2d 114, 137 N.
E. 2d 59 (1956).
82.
295
(1938).
83.

Ill.

App.

519,

15

N.

2d

E.

42

Id. at 523, 15 N. E. 2d at 44.

84. See Retail Installment Sales
tion, 58 Col. L. Rev. 854 (1958).
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